Guns, Money, and Oil: Europe's Latest Reactions to Russian Aggression

Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Oil 

On October 20, 2025, the EU Council of Ministers' energy ministers voted to end all Russian oil imports by 2028 and finalized a plan to eliminate the bloc's remaining dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The proposed plan, which is part of the European Commission's May 2025 "Roadmap to End Russian Energy Dependence",  still requires approval from the European Parliament before entering into force. If passed, it will phase out new Russian gas import contracts from January 2026, existing short-term contracts from June 2026, and long-term contracts in January 2028.

If ratified, this policy will be the most ambitious energy reorientation in EU history, aiming to distance the Union from Russian fuels completely. Despite the EU’s initiative, though, full independence remains incomplete. As of Fall 2025, Russian gas still accounts for roughly 13% of EU imports — nonetheless down from 45% before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Several countries, from Russia-aligned ones such as Hungary and Slovakia to non-allies such as France and Belgium, continue to import limited volumes through long-term contracts. Under this new policy, these states would see the most significant changes to their oil industries. 

However, despite the ambitious aims of this policy, it’s possible that EU Member States will resume their consumption of Russian energy after drastically reducing it for a short period. There is certainly precedent to expect this. 

Money

The EU's aspiration for energy decoupling runs parallel to the Union's boldest financial step yet: using frozen Russian sovereign assets to finance Ukraine's war effort and reconstruction. In 2022, the EU and its allies imposed sweeping sanctions against Russia that froze roughly €210 billion in Russian state assets. In September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed transforming those funds into a "Reparations Loan" for Ukraine, freeing up to €140 billion in financing, all to be covered by Russia.

Under the Reparations plan, the EU would first deliver a previously promised €45 billion G7-backed loan to Ukraine, before channeling the remaining proceeds into direct support for Kyiv. This would include financing Ukraine’s military procurement, rebuilding critical infrastructure destroyed by Russian attacks, and compensating civilian victims of the war.

As recognized by the European Parliamentary Research Service in February 2024, “under international law, state property is immune from measures of constraint.” However, the Commission argued their approach complies with international law, since the assets would be used as collateral rather than confiscated outright. Additionally, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde confirmed that any such move must be "consistent with international obligations…in accordance with international law (and) is mindful of financial stability" to avoid jeopardizing the euro's credibility.

Moscow has already threatened retaliation against the EU for the proposed oil reliance-reduction plan. Russia's Deputy Finance Minister said they are “closely monitoring” the EU actions, but a counter-seize of European assets would only occur if Brussels codifies the plan.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is urging its allies not to restrict how it uses the proposed loan. Iryna Mudra, a top legal adviser in Zelenskiy's administration, argues flexibility is essential. "The victim, not the donors or partners, must determine how to address its most urgent defence, recovery and compensation needs," Mudra said in a statement. 

The purchase of non-European weapons is one such need: among Kyiv's current priorities is acquiring 25 American Patriot air-defense systems. Additionally, according to Ukraine's finance ministry, the Reparations Plan will fill an $18 billion gap in the nation's 2026 budget. Given these considerations, Mudra said she hoped the Plan would "be operational by the end of 2025."

Finally, the EU is preparing its 19th sanctions package against Russia, expected to expand restrictions on oil shipping, liquefied natural gas, and materials linked to Moscow's defense industry. This package is expected to be approved.

Guns

While Europe is attempting to serve as Ukraine's economic lifeline, it has already established itself as its primary arms supplier, overtaking the United States in direct weapons deliveries. The U.K. recently announced they will begin mass production of Ukrainian-designed drones "within weeks," as part of a joint weapons program called Octopus, to supply Ukraine with thousands of interceptor drones per month. 

Additionally, President Volodymyr Zelensky secured a deal with Sweden for the purchase of up to 150 JAS-39 Gripen fighter jets, Sweden’s most advanced combat aircraft equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare suite, and short-runway operability. This will become Sweden’s largest-ever fighter aircraft export and establish joint production and technology-sharing with Ukraine; making Stockholm another European capital deeply invested in Ukraine’s defense.

Tactical cooperation, such as the recently opened joint training center for Ukrainian and NATO troops in Poland and the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM), is no longer exceptional. Instead, the EU’s recent escalation in tangible support for Ukraine and the surge in direct, government-to-government defense cooperation are indicative of larger geopolitical problems within the continent. Chiefly, American disengagement with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict poses a twofold problem: Europe now stands under an ambiguous umbrella of American security, and Ukraine might be forced to make territorial concessions — or worse, concede — if its strongest ally decides to cut off military aid. Europe is in disarray, and while the proposed EU measures seem adequate, any move to actually implement them could be stalled by bureaucratic rep tape, face pushback from Member States, or be met with retribution from Russia. Thus, bilateral action from European capitals, which although beneficial to Ukraine, simultaneously strike at the Union's credibility as a coalition capable multilateral action.

Thus far, the EU has only acted passively, responding to Russian aggression, Ukrainian appeals, and shifts in American policy rather than shaping the geopolitical environment itself. In essence, Europe's current posture is less a coherent strategy than a series of calculated adjustments, each aimed at damage control rather than long-term deterrence. Without a centralized vision or a willingness to assume risk, the EU is entrenching itself as a supporting actor subordinated to the whims of external powers, rather than acting as the decisive geopolitical force it could be.