From Sanctions to the Sahel: Russia’s Strategic Plans in West Africa

Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

After facing increasing criticism and sanctions from the West over its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has turned to Africa to build political, economic, and military partnerships. Notably, Russia has expanded its influence in the Sahel, a region marked by governmental instability and abundant natural resources. Russia desires a close relationship with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which was founded by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to guarantee mutual assistance in the event of an external attack and to achieve greater economic cooperation.

These three nations came together in this fashion after the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended their memberships over military coups within their governments. The advent of this organization and the breaking of military ties with France and America represent a growing desire among West African countries to reduce reliance on the Western powers that have dominated the region’s politics and economy since the nineteenth century. Russia has leveraged this monumental moment to enter the African political scene, purportedly to provide the Sahel’s states the commercial, industrial, and political sovereignty for which they have longed for over sixty years. 

Many political analysts have insisted, however, that the motivations behind Russian policy in West Africa are not so benign. Of capital importance are the plethoric uranium deposits beneath the Niger desert, the importation of which could help Russia diversify its energy sources and reduce its reliance on Western markets. 

Russia intends to support the AES through a variety of defense-related methods, including providing training for the armed forces and law enforcement agencies of the AES countries. Additionally, Russia has pledged to supply the AES with advanced military equipment and deploy paramilitary forces through the Wagner Group, a private military corporation (PMC) that conducts military operations internationally. The Wagner Group has been involved in several conflicts in Africa, offering mercenary units, security services, and natural resource protection for agendas that support Russian interests. As a result, the AES will likewise enjoy access to Russian technology, including telecommunication, surveillance, and espionage. 

Mali and Niger helped achieve this historic partnership by cutting ties with Ukraine in 2024 over allegations that Kyiv had lent support to terrorist groups within their borders. The Foreign Ministry of Russia has long promoted such claims and has accused Ukraine and its Western allies of concealing its complicity in the Sahel’s destabilization.  

Russia has endeavored to involve itself further with the African Union for the purpose of introducing state-sponsored media outlets that promote Russia–Africa relations and anti-Western sentiment.

Some barriers still stand in the way of this alliance. In recent years, the Sahel has proven itself a  “geopolitical hotspot” plagued by Jihadism, coup d’états, and rampant lawlessness. While the aid from Russia may increase the AES’s stability, the causes of the Sahel’s woes — poverty, weak institutions, and radical Islam — will remain fundamentally unaddressed. The mercurial vicissitudes of African politics may drive the Sahel’s regnant dictators out of power and replace them with pro-Western, anti-Russian despots. 

One must also examine Russia’s viability as an economic partner for any nation, let alone those as bedevilled by violence and poverty as Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso are. If Russia decides to pursue a policy of short-term wealth extraction vis-à-vis alliances with resource-rich countries, tensions are bound to arise. In the meantime, Western countries can counter Russian influence by maintaining their extensive alliances with the great majority of West African countries. 

Russia’s growing influence in the Sahel is, nevertheless, indicative of a growing trend of African nations diversifying their allies in recent years. Resentment towards the West, threats to state power, and fierce competition over resources have allowed Russia to assert its authority over the region. While the risks of regional conflict and Western tensions proliferate, Russia finds itself on track to become a major player in Africa. The long-term success of such machinations depends on both Russia’s political and economic might as well as the Sahel’s ability to prevent more conflict from entering the region.