Purges and Power: Centralization, Command Disruption, and the Future of the PLA

On March 11, 2023, the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the First Session of the 14th National People's Congress was held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The picture shows the Vice Chairmen and members of the Central Military Commission taking the oath of office. Courtesy of HKTKWW.

On January 24, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced investigations into two of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) most senior officers, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. They were accused of “undermining the system of the Central Military Commission Chairman's responsibility, thereby exacerbating political and corruption issues,” and “threatening the CCP's leadership over the military,” according to The PLA Daily, which is a news agency directly under the China Central Military Commission. Both officials hold critical positions in China’s military command structure. One serves as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, while the other is chief of the Joint Staff Department.

Following this large-scale personnel reshuffle and purge, as of now, only two members remain on the Central Military Commission of China—including President Xi Jinping—despite the commission traditionally comprising seven members. This investigation is one of the most significant actions targeting senior PLA leadership since 2014 and has drawn the attention of analysts studying the trajectory of China’s military governance.

Since assuming power following the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping has launched a sweeping restructuring campaign within the PLA. This initiative primarily combines anti-corruption efforts with organizational restructuring. This further signifies President Xi's commitment to dismantling the longstanding network of nepotism that has governed military promotions and procurement corruption. In 2023, a new round of disciplinary investigations targeting the highest echelons and individual military branches commenced. This year, the PLA Rocket Force underwent a major restructuring, replacing and investigating multiple former and current senior PLA officers. As a key component of China's strategic missile capabilities within the PLA, the Rocket Force subsequently saw the former and current defense ministers, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, officially announced as subjects of investigation. They were subsequently stripped of their general ranks and charged with “violating political and organizational discipline by helping others gain improper benefits in personnel arrangements,” “violating discipline regarding integrity, accepting money and gifts in violation of relevant rules.” Both cases are closely tied to the institutional development of the Rocket Force. Wei previously served as commander of the Rocket Force, and Li, before becoming defense minister, held the position of head of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission, where he was responsible for weapons procurement and major defense acquisition projects, including missile and space systems. Their career trajectories intersect with both the command and procurement aspects of the Rocket Force. Subsequently, nine senior military officials, such as He Weidong and Miao Hua, were implicated. They were accused of serious dereliction of duty, accepting bribes, and having a significant impact on the political landscape. Most of them were members of the CCP Central Committee and held the rank of general. This disciplinary action extends beyond individual misconduct to encompass the organizational network involved in strategic weapons management. Given the Rocket Force's central role in China's nuclear and conventional missile strategy, the restructuring is widely interpreted as an effort to re-establish oversight over one of the PLA's most sensitive institutions.

The investigation into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli signifies the removal of the last operational links to the PLA’s actual battlefield past. Zhang Youxia, 75, and Liu Zhenli, 61, stood as the only two high-ranking generals on the Central Military Commission (CMC) with genuine combat credentials. Both men have participated in actual wars and are widely regarded as close confidants of President Xi Jinping.This presents a dilemma for Xi and the PLA: if they are determined to crack down on corruption, it will create a vacancy for officers and generals with combat experience, which may further hinder the improvement of the Chinese military's strength.

This purge has also impacted Xi Jinping's personal prestige. Within and outside the military, numerous high-ranking officials and officers have been investigated and dismissed for corruption, many of whom were promoted by Xi since 2012. For example, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, who served as the Director-General of the Protocol Department and provided protocol planning services for Xi Jinping and other high-ranking officials at diplomatic events, was dismissed less than a year after taking office. The same applies to Zhang and Liu, as well as other PLA officials. 

This indicates that being Xi's confidant is no longer a guarantee of protection in officialdom, and Xi himself has begun to doubt the loyalty of his close associates. The fact that the CMC has been reduced to only two active members sends a chilling message to the remaining officer corps: that neither career-long loyalty nor "princeling" status offers immunity from political scrutiny.

According to some analytics, Zhang and Liu’s strategy might be different from Xi’s approach. Mr. Thompson, the former Pentagon official, saw Zhang as someone who could effectively provide military advice to President Xi, and he’s “worrying about” the current vacancy of this kind of character. John Garnaut, a founder of the geopolitical risk advisory firm Garnaut Global and a former China correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald, pointed out that this internal constraint on Xi Jinping's personal power could exacerbate instability in Taiwan. 

In contrast, some argue that the investigation and suspension of these officials in key positions could potentially delay Xi Jinping's plans to invade Taiwan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, which oversees managing vital national resources and organizing support operations from other theater commands, and the Eastern Theater Command, which is primarily in charge of invasion operations, must work closely together to carry out plans for operations against Taiwan. Generals like this have already resigned.

The ongoing probe represents a significant restructuring of the PLA's leadership structure and another phase in Xi's long-term anti-corruption campaign towards senior officials, including his close associates. These actions create operational uncertainty, even while they might improve Party control and ideological discipline. This purge presents a dilemma: a tighter political control could increase allegiance, but shifting leadership and the breakdown of command structures might change how leadership carries out intricate cooperative operations. Whether this shift results in a more professional army or a more risk-averse, politically limited command structure will determine the course of China's military performance.