Dual-Use Satellites and the Concerns to U.S. National Security

Illustration of satellite coverage for telecommunications services. Courtesy of the ESA-Science Office.

The militarization of space is no longer a distant question; it is the reality that is shaping the global space industry. In this sector, the most current and pressing concern is the implementation of dual-use satellites. China, a nation that relies on a civil-military fusion to expand its military power under the guise of commercial development, has launched satellites that appear to serve only a civil capacity, but actually provide numerous strategic advantages for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Many of these systems, known as constellations, pose a concern to U.S. national security; however, the most threatening are Yaogan, Guowang, and Shijian. 

The Yaogan satellite constellation perfectly illustrates how China blends civilian and military functions to strengthen its position on Earth. Although publicly described as an Earth observation tool for resource studies, agricultural yield estimation, and disaster prevention, Yaogan also operates as a core part of China’s intelligence and surveillance network. Its satellites collect signals, intelligence, and radar data that allow the PLA to identify, locate, and track U.S. and allied ships and aircraft throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This constant monitoring gives China the information needed to support long-range missile targeting and to challenge U.S. air and naval operations near Taiwan. Yaogan ultimately creates an operating environment where American forces must assume they are always being watched and that exposure can quickly be exploited by the PLA. 

The Guowang constellation similarly shows how China uses large-scale commercial projects to strengthen military capability. Guowang, which translates to “national network,” is publicly promoted as a national broadband system and is often described as China’s equivalent to SpaceX’s Starlink. The primary concern for this constellation is that these satellites are designed to provide wide coverage, resilient communications, and data relay to support PLA operations around the world. Although public data is scarce, as of November 2025, the Guowang network consists of approximately 104 satellites that operate within low-earth orbit, ultimately creating a system capable of global transmission. Its satellites carry a mix of broadband, imaging, and radar payloads that can link naval, air, and missile forces across the Western Pacific. Media reports from February 2024 note that Chinese Coast Guard surface vessels operating near Taiwanese territorial waters were involved with testing and integrating Guowang constellation services with China’s DF-21D and DF-26B ballistic missiles. The DF-21D, known as the “carrier killer,” is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea. The DF-26B, or the “Guam Killer,” is China’s ballistic missile capable of striking U.S. forces on Guam. The Guowang constellation is designed to support PLA operations and is yet another example of military technology developed to supplement the impending Taiwanese invasion. 

Officially, Shijian satellites support civil missions such as refueling aging spacecraft and removing space debris. In 2021, Shijian-21, publicly described as a debris-mitigation vehicle, docked with a defunct Chinese satellite and towed it into a “graveyard orbit.” Shijian-21 carried payloads including a robotic arm to capture, manipulate, and relocate satellites and debris. Upon further investigation, it is clear that the implications for counter-space measures are immense. ASAT, or anti-satellite, weapons are built into the Shijian model. A potential attack on U.S. space infrastructure could look like towing U.S. satellites out of orbit, ultimately damaging communications or navigation networks. In practice, the civil label of the program masks its growing capacity to put U.S. satellites at risk, reinforcing the broader pattern of dual-use development that characterizes China’s rise in space.

These capabilities are not to be taken lightly – the U.S. has already seen strong signs of Chinese aggression in space. In 2024, five Chinese satellites were witnessed “dogfighting” in low Earth orbit. These satellites conducted synchronized proximity maneuvers, weaving around one another and practicing techniques associated with on-orbit interference and orbital combat. This demonstration confirmed that China is not only developing dual-use technology but is also actively rehearsing the tactics needed to disable or disrupt U.S. and allied forces’ space infrastructure. 

Such behavior shows that China no longer views space as a neutral domain but as a territory to be shaped, pressured, and controlled before conflict begins. As Ye Peijian, chief designer of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, bluntly states, “the universe is an ocean, the moon is the Diaoyu Islands, Mars is Huangyan Island.” The Diaoyu and Huangyan Islands are sovereign territories that China unlawfully claims. When combined with the rapid expansion of dual-use constellations, these actions reveal a clear trajectory toward a space environment where China’s civilian labels conceal military intent, and where the United States must prepare to defend its satellites against both subtle and overt forms of interference. 

Satellite constellations are the systems that underpin global communication, navigation, and military power. If China were to surpass the United States in developing a robust dual-use satellite program, Washington’s critical infrastructure would be at risk, disrupting the balance of power that has long relied on American technological leadership. Satellites enable daily life and carry growing national security implications that adversaries are already working to undermine. Greater public awareness, support for resilient space infrastructure, and continuous investment in U.S. space capabilities are essential steps to ensure the United States can maintain its access to space and ensure stability in an increasingly militarized domain.